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distinguishing the contributions of labor turnover and human capital depreciation to organizational
forgetting. We apply our framework to a novel dataset of ambulance companies and their workforce. We find
evidence of organizational forgetting, which results from skill decay and turnover effects. The latter has twice
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Several recent studies have estimated organizational forgetting rates for firms in specific industries (Linda Argote, Sara L. Beckman, and Dennis Epple 1990; 
Eric Darr, Argote, and Epple 1995; Epple, Argote, and Kenneth Murphy 1996; C. 
Lanier Benkard 2000; Peter Thompson 2007; Gautam Gowrisankaran, Vivian Ho, 
and Robert Town 2006). Organizational forgetting occurs when the firm’s stock of 
production experience depreciates over time (Argote, Beckman, and Epple 1990).
The depreciation of organizational knowledge is thought to involve a number of 
factors, including individual, technological, environmental, and work force changes 
(Argote 1999). We argue that these factors lead to organizational forgetting through 
their effects on the value of human capital. In particular, there are two broad chan-
nels through which forgetting at the firm level may occur: the depreciation of human 
capital (Winfred Arthur, Jr. et al. 1998) and labor turnover, whereby experienced 
employees are replaced by new ones.
These channels of organizational forgetting are important when there is techno-
logical change or failure to record firm experience. When human capital is imper-
fectly transferrable across technologies, technological change lowers the value of 
individual experience and hence leads to smaller negative turnover effects, as new 
technologies render existing human capital obsolete. Similarly, a failure to record 
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Studies of organizational learning and forgetting identify potential 
channels through which the firm’s production experience is lost. 
These channels have differing implications for efficient resource allo-
cation within the firm, but their relative importance has been ignored 
to date. We develop a framework for distinguishing the contributions 
of labor turnover and human capital depreciation to organizational 
forgetting. We apply our framework to a novel dataset of ambulance 
companies and their workforce. We find evidence of organizational 
forgetting, which results from skill decay and turnover effects. The lat-
ter has twice the magnitude of the former. (JEL D23, D83, J24, J63) 
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firm experience may exacerbate both human capital depreciation (as existing 
workers lack records to refresh their memories or reinforce routines) and turnover 
effects (as new workers do not have access to an organizational body of knowledge).
Distinguishing between human capital depreciation and labor turnover effects is 
important for resource allocation within firms. However, because existing studies 
have relied on organizational level data, they cannot make this distinction.
There is an extensive literature on skill decay and skill retention among indi-
viduals (Arthur et al. 1998; Argote 1999). Most broadly, skill decay refers to the 
deterioration of acquired skills over time. The amount learned and the passage of 
time are the two most important determinants of skill decay (Charles D. Bailey 
1989). Individual competence is commonly measured in terms of either speed or 
accuracy, with speed being more prone to depreciate over time (Susan Bodilly et al. 
1986). The distinction between speed and accuracy is important since most studies 
of organizational forgetting focus on industries in which production processes are 
characterized by fixed-sequence tasks (e.g., following a protocol), for which skill 
decay has been shown to be most pronounced (Joseph D. Hagman and Andrew M. 
Rose 1983).
The empirical evidence on the effect of labor turnover on organizational forget-
ting is mixed (Argote, Beckman, and Epple 1990; Argote 1999; Thompson 2007). 
Labor turnover effects are potentially important when the human capital acquired by 
former workers is less valuable to current performance than that of current employ-
ees. However, without data on the employment histories of workers, previous stud-
ies had to measure a firm’s experience stock as the accumulated experiences of all 
workers, whether currently employed or not.
A combination of task, market, and industry-specific characteristics govern the 
relative importance of skill decay and labor turnover in shaping organizational 
forgetting. The two channels imply different strategies to mitigate organizational 
forgetting. For instance, retention policies to reduce labor turnover may include 
improved compensation packages or safe working environments. On the other hand, 
skill decay may be slowed by limiting periods of inactivity or frequent refreshers. 
For example, more flexibility in scheduling may appeal to workers and so lessen 
turnover rates. But strict scheduling designed to reduce periods of inactivity may 
slow skill decay.
We provide a framework for studying the relative contributions of labor turn-
over effects and skill decay to organizational forgetting. Most studies of organi-
zational learning and forgetting have focused on large scale industrial settings. In 
contrast, this paper focuses on a setting in the service sector. We study trauma-
related ambulance runs in Mississippi between 1991 and 2005. The nature of 
emergency medical services (EMS) allows us to attribute performance to indi-
vidual paramedics, and thus measure human capital depreciation in a profession 
in which individual skills may decay, and in an industry with high labor turnover 
rates. Indeed, we find that both human capital depreciation and turnover contribute 
to organizational forgetting, with turnover effects having twice the magnitude of 
individual skill decay.
Because we can track individual performance, we can study individual human 
capital depreciation directly. We consider the effects of individual production 
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inactivity and the scope of tasks (interference), two mechanisms commonly associ-
ated with skill decay.1
The paper is organized as follows: Section I describes our framework for 
measuring human capital depreciation and labor turnover effects in the context 
of organizational forgetting. In Section II, we adapt the framework to the EMS 
setting to measure the contributions of individual production inactivity and the 
scope of tasks to human capital depreciation. In Section III, we describe the data 
and other determinants of performance. In Section IV, we discuss our results. 
Section V concludes.
I. Framework
The human capital of individual i may be defined as the total stock of past produc-
tion experiences,  e i,t =  e i,t−1 +  ϕ i,t where  ϕ i,t is the experience accrued by individual 
i between t − 1 and time t and ei,t the experience accumulated by t.2 However, this 
formulation does not allow for forgetting, nor for the greater salience (or, perhaps, 
relevance) of recent experience. The drawback of this approach is that an experience 
from the distant past is treated as perfect substitute for a recent one.
A more flexible definition of human capital, referred to as the forgetting model 
(Argote, Beckman, and Epple 1990; Benkard 2000; Gowrisankaran, Ho, and Town 
2006; Thompson 2007), defines experience by
(1)   e i,t = λ  e i,t−1 +  ϕ i,t .
The parameter λ allows for forgetting (i.e., λ < 1) and captures the intuition that 
less recent experiences may be less relevant for today’s performance. Here (1 − λ) 
can be viewed as the rate of human capital depreciation.
Let Nt be the number of employees in the firm in period t, such that  N t ≡  N t−1 − 
m t +  n t , where mt and nt are the number of employees exiting and entering the firm 
between t − 1 and t, respectively.
We partition the firm’s experience in period t into three mutually exclusive groups: 
[λ  ∑ i=1  N t−1 − m t   e i,t−1 +  ∑ i=1  N t−1 − m t   ϕ i,t ] is the human capital of  N t−1 −  m t stayers, corre-
sponding to equation (1); μ  [ ∑ i= N t−1 − m t +1  N t   ϕ i,t ] is the recent experience accumulated 
by the  n t entrants, where the parameter μ represents the value to the firm of new 
employee experience; and  [γ  ∑ j=1 t−1  ∑ k=1  m j    ek,t−1 ] is the value of past experience of 
all exitors, allowing the firm to retain a different proportion, γ, of exitors’ human 
capital, where j indexes the exit period of individual k, and the value to the firm of 
former employee k’s human capital evolves according to   ek,t = γ   ek,t−1 .3
1 Individual level data is not sufficient for studying individual skill decay. One must also attribute performance 
to individuals, as in the case of EMS.
2 In large scale manufacturing settings, experience is measured in production units, such as the number of air-
craft produced (Benkard 2000), the number of ships built (Thompson 2007), etc. In EMS, experience is measured 
as the volume of emergencies.
3 Note that for simplicity, we assume no employee reentry to the firm.
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The sum of the three components, presented in equation (2), is the value of the 
firm’s cumulative experience in period t,
(2)  E t =  [λ  ∑ 
i=1
 N t−1 − m t 
  e i,t−1 +  ∑ 
i=1
 N t−1 − m t 
  ϕ i, t ] +  [γ  ∑ 
j=1
t−1
 ∑ 
k=1
 m j 
   ek,t−1 ] +  [   μ  ∑ 
i= N t−1 − m t +1
 
 N t 
  ϕ i,t ] .
Individual worker identifiers, as in equation (1), are essential for decomposing 
organizational forgetting into human capital depreciation and turnover effects. In 
the absence of individual level data, the distinction between forgetting that arises 
through the loss of human capital accumulated by individuals who left the firm and 
human capital depreciation of workers still employed by the firm cannot be made. 
Similarly, the distinction between the contribution of recent experience of veterans 
and that of new employees cannot be made.
These limitations impose strong assumptions on the sources for organizational 
forgetting. Specifically, they assume perfect exchangeability of past experience on 
current performance across all employees, including those who are no longer in the 
firm.
To see this, we can write the cumulative experience profiles for the firm as:
(3)  ˜  E t = λ  [   ∑ 
i=1
 N t−1 − m t 
  e i,t−1 +  ∑ 
j=1
t−1
 ∑ 
k=1
 m j 
   ek, t−1  *  ] +  [   ∑ 
i=1
 N t−1 − m t 
  ϕ i, t +    ∑ 
i= N t−1 − m t +1
 
 N t 
  ϕ i,t ] ,
 8 8
  ˜  E t−1  q t 
where  ˜  E t is the value of aggregate experience of all current and past employees 
in period t. The first bracketed term on the right hand-side of equation (3) is the 
sum of experience accumulated by individuals up to (and including) period t − 1 
(i.e.,  ˜  E t−1 ). This term is determined by individuals who are still employed by the 
firm in period t and those who were no longer with the firm as of t − 1, terms that 
are impossible to construct separately without individual level data.4 The second 
bracketed term, qt, is the sum of the recent experiences accumulated between t − 1 
and t by individuals who joined the firm prior to t − 1 and by new employees who 
joined the firm between t − 1 and t. Equation (3) imbeds the assumption that the 
value of recent experiences of both new employees and veterans are identical from 
the firm’s perspective.
Equation (3) highlights the implicit restrictions on the parameters of equation 
(2) when individual level data is unavailable. Specifically, equations (2) and (4) 
coincide when the human capital of exiting workers is as valuable for current pro-
duction as that of current employees (i.e., λ = γ) and when new employees’ current 
experience is as valuable for production as that of established workers (i.e., μ = 1).
When employee-level data is unavailable, as in Benkard (2000), Gowrisankaran, 
Ho, and Town (2006), and Thompson (2007), entrants, stayers, and exitors are indis-
tinguishable and are therefore treated as contributing equally to current production. 
4 Note that  ˜  E t ≠  E t in part since  ∑ j=1 t   ∑ k=1  m j    ek,t  *  =  ∑ j=1 t   ∑ k=1  m j   λ t−j ⋅  ek,j while  ∑ j=1 t   ∑ k=1  m j    ek,t     =  ∑ j=1 t   ∑ k=1  m j   γ t−j ⋅  ek, j , where j is the exit period for individual k.
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Hence, forgetting is measured from the firm’s stock of experience in period t, and 
under the following law of motion for the organization’s experience stock:
(4)  ˜  E t = λ  ˜  E t−1 +  q t .
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of a hypothetical firm’s accumulated experience over 
time. The solid line tracks the evolution of all experience ever accumulated in the 
firm ( ˜  E t ), with the underlying assumption that past experiences of individuals cur-
rently in the firm and those of individuals who left it are equally valuable to current 
production (i.e., λ = γ). The dotted line tracks the aggregate human capital of the 
firm’s current employees ( E t ) in each period t, restricting μ to 1 and the human 
capital accumulated by individuals who left the firm to have zero value in current 
firm production (i.e., γ = 0, such that  E t =  ∑ i=1  N t−1 − m t   e i,t ). The magnitude of the dis-
crete drops in the dotted line reflects the human capital lost (instantaneously) when 
workers exit. When 0 < γ < λ, the evolution of the firm’s accumulated experience 
over time would fall between the solid and the dotted lines, with the magnitude of 
the drops depending on γ. When μ < 1, the dotted line becomes flatter as current 
  Firm 
experience  
Time  
 ˜E 
 t
 = E
t
(γ = λ,  = 1)
E
t
 (γ = 0,  < 1)
Figure 1. Measures of Accumulated Firm Experience Over Time
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employees represent a mixture of new and seasoned workers. The gap between the 
two lines would therefore increase the smaller μ and γ are.
The ability to measure the magnitude of skill decay from firm level data depends 
on the extent of turnover as well as its cost to the firm. Equation (5) highlights the 
effects that are confounded in equation (4) when studying skill decay, expressed in 
the form of an omitted variable.5
(5)  E t = λ  ˜  E t−1 +  q t −  [   ∑ 
j=1
t
  ∑ 
k=1
 m j 
 ( λ t−j −  γ t−j )   ek, j + (1 − μ)  ∑ 
i= N t−1 − m t +1
 
 N t 
  ϕ i,t ] .
As made explicit in equation (3), the term  ∑ j=1 t−1   ∑ k=1  m j    ek, j  *  is a component of  ˜  E t−1 , 
and is therefore highly correlated with it. Omitting this term from a regression model 
will bias the coefficient on  ˜  E t−1 (towards zero when λ > γ). The gap between the 
lines in Figure 1 corresponds to the bracketed term in equation (5), which illustrates 
the loss of information when only aggregate firm data are available.
Define  
_ ϕt and  _ et−1 as the current and past experience of the average employee 
at time t. When evaluating the cost of human capital depreciation between t − 1 
and t, the benchmark is the case of no forgetting. Therefore, the contribution of 
the average employee’s human capital depreciation to organizational forgetting is 
 
_ et−1 (1 − λ), where (1 − λ) is the rate of human capital depreciation. The effect of 
turnover on organizational forgetting is a combination of two components; the first 
is the cost to the firm of losing an experienced employee relative to retaining that 
experience inside the firm,  
_ et−1 (λ − γ), and the second is the cost to the firm of hir-
ing a new employee relative to an experienced one,  
_ ϕt (1 − μ).
The joint effect of human capital depreciation and turnover for the average employ-
ee, measured in performance terms, is  
_ et−1 (1 − γ) +  _ ϕt (1 − μ) =  [ _ et−1 (1 − λ)] + [ _ et−1 (λ − γ) +  _ ϕt (1 − μ)] . The relative contribution of turnover to organizational 
forgetting is ( _ et−1 (λ − γ) +  _ ϕt (1 − μ))/( _ et−1 (1 − γ) +  _ ϕt (1 − μ)), while that of 
employee human capital depreciation is  
_ et−1 (1 − λ)/( _ et−1 (1 − γ) +  _ ϕt (1 − μ)). 
When μ = 1, new employees contribute as much to firm experience as established 
ones, and the relative contributions of turnover and skill obsolescence to firm forget-
ting are constant at (λ − γ)/(1 − γ) and (1 − λ)/(1 − γ) respectively. However, 
when μ differs from 1, the relative importance of each channel depends on average 
current-period experience and that of exiting employees and therefore on the speed 
of turnover within the firm. The greater the turnover rate, the lower is  
_ et−1 , and the 
lesser the importance of human capital depreciation in organizational forgetting. 
This confirms the intuition that human capital depreciation loses its relative impor-
tance when employment spells are short and the scope for erosion of individual 
human capital is limited.
5 To derive the first term in the bracketed expression in (5), note that since   ek,j  *  =   ek, j    at the time of exit, where j 
marks individual k’s date of exit, the difference between the value of exitors’ human capital retained at rate λ rela-
tive to rate γ is λ  ∑ k=1  X t    ek, t−1  *  − γ  ∑ k=1  X t    ek,t−1 =  ∑ j=1 t   ∑ k=1  m j  ( λ t−j −  γ t−j )   ek, j      .
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II. Empirical Application
We apply our framework to the universe of trauma-related ambulance runs in 
Mississippi between 1991 and 2005. Trauma patients, who are involved in such 
incidents as automobile accidents, injuries from falls, and criminal violence, are 
stabilized, treated, and transported to definitive care by EMS providers.
Demand conditions are important in EMS. Specifically, the unpredictable nature 
of emergencies and the importance of speed require ambulance units to be dis-
patched based on proximity and availability. This limits the firm’s ability to match 
task and talent, which weakens the role of organizational capital in mitigating for-
getting (Edward C. Prescott and Michael Visscher 1980).
Both human capital depreciation and turnover effects are likely to play roles in 
EMS. On the one hand, the EMS provider’s performance depends on acquired skills 
(e.g., closed-loop tasks), which are subject to skill decay. On the other hand, for EMS 
companies, retention of paramedics is a persistent issue due to concerns regarding 
personal safety, stressful working conditions, irregular hours, excessive training and 
requirements, limited mobility, and low wages (Institute of Medicine Committee on 
the Future of Emergency Care in the United States Health System 2007).
The medical literature provides little guidance as to the right approach for man-
aging out-of-hospital trauma victims. Yet, conditional on the characteristics of 
patients, paramedics, injury, medical interventions performed, and of the scene, and 
since care provided in the field by emergency medical technicians is not definitive, 
there is no dispute that a shorter out-of-hospital time is preferred to a longer one.6 In 
the case where care is rendered on-scene, better diagnostic and therapeutic expertise 
is essential in reducing pre-hospital intervals. In this application, we therefore iden-
tify additional experience as participation in additional ambulance runs and perfor-
mance as the total out-of-hospital time for a trauma incident, which is considered a 
key marker of EMS performance (Brendan G. Carr et al. 2006). The importance of 
getting the patient to definitive care as soon as possible, allowing only for the perfor-
mance of essential procedures, is widely accepted, as shorter out-of-hospital EMS 
time intervals represent an important factor in survival (Stan Feero et al. 1995).7 As 
such, contracts between municipalities and EMS organizations almost universally 
specify standards for pre-hospital duration. In many cases, these are the only stan-
dards mentioned and enforced (Institute of Medicine 2007; Theodore R. Delbridge 
et al. 1998).
As paramedics become more proficient in identifying faster routes, diagnosing 
patient acuity, identifying the appropriate procedures, mastering protocols and tech-
niques, and exercising better judgment in crisis situations, shorter out-of-hospital 
times result. Moreover, skilled paramedics require less outside communication and 
medical oversight, which in turn contribute to lowering out-of-hospital time.
6 Total out-of-hospital time is defined as the time (in minutes) from the moment the unit is alerted of an incident 
to the moment it delivers the patient(s) to the hospital/trauma center.
7 Mississippi does not systematically collect patient discharge data, rendering it impossible to match EMS inci-
dents to mortality or other patient health outcomes.
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We develop models linking the human capital accumulated by paramedics to out-
of-hospital time. The input of interest is the human capital of paramedics, as mea-
sured by their recent and past experiences as of the date of the incident.
Formally, consider a trauma scene at date t in which injured patient k requires 
some pre-hospital intervention(s) by paramedic i. Out-of-hospital time may be writ-
ten as
(6) lnoh T ikt =  β e ln  e it +  β X X kt +  β W W it +  φ t +  η i +  ε ikt ,
where oh T ikt is the out-of-hospital time for patient k attended by paramedic i.  e i,t is 
paramedic i’s experience as of date t.  X kt capture the characteristics of the patient, 
such as her age, sex, race, and all interactions of injury type and injured body part. 
It also captures characteristics of the incident, such as type and location of trauma. 
In addition to paramedic experience,  W it includes paramedic characteristics, such 
as their certification levels, the certification level and experience of the driver that 
is paired with them, the team’s joint experience, and the type of firm they work for. 
φ t is a vector of indicators for hour of day, day of the week, month and year.  η i are 
individual paramedic fixed effects and  ε ikt is a random disturbance. The parameter β e measures the degree of paramedic learning.
The law of motion in (1) calls for estimating equation (6) by nonlinear least 
squares according to the following specification:
(7) ln oh T ikt =  β e ln  (λ  e i,t−1 +  ϕ i,t ) +  β X X kt +  β W W it +  φ t +  η i +  ε ikt .
Our measure of recent paramedic experience, ϕ, accumulates experience over run-
ning 3-month windows, recording paramedic volume at a given date as the number 
of trauma runs accumulated during the prior 91 days.8 This measure is more precise 
than fixed calendar quarters, used extensively in the learning literature applied to 
health care providers, as it responds instantaneously to any changes in the recent 
experience profile.9 We construct similar measures of experience for drivers and 
driver-paramedic pairs.
Individual paramedic fixed effects are introduced to mitigate concerns that the 
relationship between experience and performance observed in the cross-section is 
driven by composition effects. For example, low quality paramedics might partici-
pate in fewer runs whereas more able paramedics may accumulate more experience 
by working more intensely and/or staying in the profession longer. Paramedic fixed 
effects therefore ensure that the experience parameters in (7) are identified from 
improvements in performance within paramedic.
8 For each incident, we look back 91 days, tallying the number of trauma incidents attended by the paramedic 
sent to a particular scene ( ϕ i,t ). Similarly, we count the trauma incidents attended in the 91-day window starting 
182 days ago ( ϕ i,t −1), then 273 days ago ( ϕ i,t −2), then 364 days ago ( ϕ i,t −3), and so on. The parameter λ should 
therefore be interpreted as quarterly retention rate. While the definition of time interval over which to accumulate 
volume is somewhat arbitrary, three-month windows turn out to be computationally convenient given the size of the 
dataset used in our application. Shrinking the size of the look-back window would add to the computational burden.
9 Experience accumulation with moving windows can be viewed as smoothing the calendar quarter step function 
and alleviating the imprecision which increases the further incidents are from the beginning of the quarter.
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The study of human capital accumulation among paramedics is particularly well 
suited for studying learning and forgetting as the unpredictable nature of emergen-
cies does not lend itself to the type of selection on unobserved quality that exists 
whenever the choice of producers is driven by the quality of their products or ser-
vices. Ambulance units are dispatched based on proximity and not on reputation, 
and trauma victims do not choose the providers of emergency pre-hospital care.10
Specifically, conditional on observables and on fixed effects,  ε ikt is unlikely to be 
related to paramedic characteristics, be they quality, ability or, importantly, experi-
ence as selection on such unobservables is unlikely to occur given the current design 
of the EMS system. This is a major benefit of studying learning and forgetting in the 
context of emergency medical services, and as a result, the parameters in (7) can be 
consistently estimated by (nonlinear) least squares.
In turn, organizational forgetting is estimated using the definition of firm experi-
ence in (4), which corresponds to the case where individual data are not available.
(8) ln oh T kt =  β  ˜  E  ln  ( λ  ˜  E   ˜  E t−1 +  q t ) +  β X X kt +  φ t +  ε kt .
Our measure of recent firm experience, qt, accumulates trauma incidents served by 
the responding firm over the 91 days preceding each incident. Thus, we ignore the 
detail in our data about which paramedic and driver were sent to which scene, and 
aggregate the firm’s quarterly volume over the set of paramedics it employs, count-
ing each incident as one experience.
Following Thompson (2007), in equation (8) we estimate including and exclud-
ing hiring and separation rates. Additional information on hiring and separation 
rates creates an intermediate case between having no ability to track individuals and 
having an individual-level panel, as it tracks turnover-related dynamics in addition 
to firm-level experience accumulation.11 The measure of firm experience, repre-
sented by the solid line in Figure 1, ignores any information on individual providers 
and therefore excludes time varying paramedic characteristics such as certification 
level and experience as well as paramedic fixed effects.
Finally, we estimate organizational forgetting using the definition of firm experi-
ence in (5). For comparability, we use the same set of controls as in (8).
(9)  ln oh T kt =  β E ln  ( λ E  ˜  E t−1 +  q t −  [  ∑ 
j=1
t
  ∑ 
k=1
 m j 
 ( λ E t−j −  γ t−j )   ek,j    
 + (1 − μ)   ∑ 
i= N t−1 − m t +1
 
 N t 
  ϕ i,t ] ) +  β X X kt +  φ t +  ε kt .
In equation (9), we exploit the unique paramedic identifiers in our data to define 
hiring and separation dates using each paramedic’s first and last ambulance run, 
10 While in Table 4 we provide evidence in support of random assignment, matching scene acuity to paramedic 
experience will lead to conservative estimates of the effect of experience on performance, as it will bias our results 
towards zero.
11 Technically, even if data on exit dates of employees were available, introducing dummies to mark the date of 
an employee’s exit will not recover  λ E , as  ∑ j=1 t−1  ∑ k=1  m j    ek, j is time varying by virtue of human capital depreciation.
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respectively. Using these definitions, we construct measures that track the experi-
ence of paramedics in their first quarter on the job, and record that of paramedics no 
longer in the firm as of the date of their exit.
The variation originating from the drops in the dotted line (in Figure 1) allows 
us to disentangle γ from λE. It is important to note that the coefficient estimate of 
organizational forgetting,  λ  ˜  E  , obtained from estimating equation (8) is a weighted 
average of  λ E s and γs as the overall effect of organizational forgetting depends on 
both the rate of turnover and the magnitude of human capital lost to it.
III. Data
Our data were obtained from the Office of Emergency Planning and Response 
at the Mississippi Department of Health. Since 1991, this office has systematically 
collected incident-level EMS data through the Mississippi Emergency Medical 
Services Information System (MEMSIS). The raw data are recorded at the indi-
vidual patient level by local EMS providers.
We limit our attention to emergency incidents for which the initial call was related 
to trauma (defined as motor vehicle crashes, motorcycle crashes, pedestrian injuries, 
stabbings, assaults, gunshots, or falls).12 To focus on EMS runs where time to defini-
tive care is most likely to be important, we exclude cases of death on arrival and 
limit the sample to calls involving at least one patient injury and ending in transport 
to hospitals by ground transportation.13
Detailed data on medical interventions and procedures are available only for the 
2001–2005 period. While we restrict our analysis to this latter period, we use data for 
all years (1991–2005) to construct the history of paramedics’ experiences, encom-
passing approximately 613,000 trauma runs. Our data allows us to follow 1,740 
uncensored paramedics (85 percent of paramedics in our data) from their entry into 
the profession and construct measures of their tenure and cumulative experience. 
The final sample includes approximately 177,000 observations (or 146,000 observa-
tions, excluding censored paramedics).
With the Emergency Medical Services Systems Act of 1973, Congress delegated the 
responsibility for overseeing EMS provision, financing, and organization to municipal-
ities (Delbridge et al. 1998). Local governments can provide these services in-house, 
usually through their fire department or, alternatively, contract with local hospital-based 
or other ambulance companies (David and Arthur J. Chiang 2009). Mississippi encom-
passes 86 contracting municipalities (82 counties and four cities). Each contracting 
area corresponds to a single EMS provider, with some serving multiple contracting 
areas.14 We control for the type of agency providing EMS in our analysis.
12 Given the highly skewed nature of reported interval times, and the possibility of extreme values due to mis-
coding, we exclude calls for which either the reported time from dispatch to arrival on the scene or the reported time 
from leaving the scene to arrival to a hospital exceeds 60 minutes. This criterion excluded less than one percent of 
trauma observations.
13 A number of companies in Mississippi provide air ambulance services. We exclude less than 400 such obser-
vations, in which helicopters and fixed wings were dispatched. Therefore, all runs in our data involve ground 
transportation.
14 All contracting municipalities in Mississippi operate on sole provider agreements, which assign a single 
advanced life support (ALS) provider to each contracting municipality. The local ALS provider (the “firm” in our 
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Local and national guidelines require advanced life support teams responding to 
trauma calls to be composed, at a minimum, of one driver and one paramedic (EMT-
P).15 Paramedics can engage in advanced airway management, cardiac monitoring, 
drug therapy and/or advanced techniques that exceed the level provided by techni-
cians with lower certification levels. Team composition may therefore affect total 
out-of-hospital time through the quantity and complexity of procedures performed 
on scene. In addition to the experience of the paramedic, we control for the driver’s 
experience and certification level as well as for the experience accumulated jointly 
by the paramedic-driver pair (i.e., the team).
To proxy for the underlying severity, we control for the number and types of pro-
cedures, the type of trauma and patient characteristics. In addition, our data include 
detailed information on the injured body part (i.e., arm, leg, chest, hip, back, neck, 
head, face, abdomen, and eye) and the type of injury (i.e., pain, burn, laceration, 
soft tissue, blunt, fracture or dislocation, penetrating trauma, and amputation). We 
control for all possible combinations of these indicators, as they are likely to be 
correlated with the severity of the injury which, in turn, is likely to be an important 
determinant of total out-of-hospital time.
While we are interested in the effect of firm experience on total out-of-hospital 
time, there are many other factors that may affect this marker of performance. These 
confounders, presented in Table 1, include the type of trauma, the incident location, 
patient characteristics, the number and types of procedures performed, the month 
and year, the certification level of the EMTs, the company that employs them, the 
municipality they operate in, and the number of victims.16
The timing of the call may affect total out-of-hospital time as well. Weather con-
ditions, varying by season, may also affect the time needed to reach, access, stabi-
lize, and transport patients. Potential lack of artificial lighting and fatigue, especially 
at night, could affect the speed of operation at the scene. Therefore, in our analysis, 
we control for year, month, day of week, and hour of the day.
IV. Results
In this section, we begin by presenting estimates of organizational forgetting, 
turnover effects and human capital depreciation in EMS at the firm level. We then 
present analyses of potential mechanisms leading to skill decay at the individual 
paramedic level.
analysis) may compete with other firms for the exclusive contract, yet faces no competition in dispatching once 
they secure the contract.
15 The three national standard levels of training for Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) are: EMT-Basic 
(EMT-B), EMT-Intermediate (EMT-I), and EMT-Paramedic (EMT-P). The US Department of Transportation 
(DOT) provided the basis for the education of EMTs and Paramedics. In addition, Mississippi requires operators 
of ambulance vehicles to be EMT-Driver certified (EMT-D), by participating in a training program in operation of 
emergency vehicles.
16 Approximately 75 percent of trauma incidents involved a single patient and 98 percent involved at most three 
individuals.
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Table 1—Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD
Out-of-hospital time 36.05 minutes 16.62
Paramedic number of runs in last 3 months 18.02 trauma runs 12.35
Firm number of runs in last 3 months 458.91 trauma runs 530.69
Paramedic total number of runs (uncensored) 409.37 trauma runs 298.96
Paramedic-driver pair total number of runs 27.81 trauma runs 57.11
Number of procedures
Number of EMS procedures in incident 1.99 procedures 2.19
Demographics and people in incident
Patient age 42.12 years 25.10
Patient race: African American 40.67% 0.491
Patient race: white 56.00% 0.496
Patient gender: female 55.08% 0.497
Number of victims in incident 1.33 victims 0.743
EMS times and trauma characteristics
Type of trauma: fall 31.49% 0.464
Type of trauma: motor vehicle crash 53.00% 0.499
Type of trauma: motorcycle accident 1.15% 0.106
Type of trauma: pedestrian accident 1.69% 0.129
Type of trauma: cut/stabbing 2.34% 0.151
Type of trauma: assault 8.83% 0.284
Type of trauma: gunshot 1.51% 0.122
Location of trauma: city street 20.66% 0.405
Location of trauma: county road 9.33% 0.291
Location of trauma: state/federal highway 23.69% 0.425
Location of trauma: residence 30.53% 0.461
Location of trauma: other 15.80% 0.365
Year, month, day of week, hour of the day
Year 2001 19.61% 0.397
Year 2002 21.55% 0.411
Year 2003 19.66% 0.397
Year 2004 19.75% 0.398
Year 2005 19.43% 0.396
January 7.54% 0.264
February 7.78% 0.268
March 8.76% 0.283
April 8.79% 0.283
May 9.15% 0.288
June 8.54% 0.279
July 8.78% 0.283
August 7.90% 0.270
September 7.99% 0.271
October 8.20% 0.274
November 8.33% 0.276
December 8.24% 0.275
certification levels
Cerification level: EMT-Basic 2.55% 0.158
Cerification level: EMT-Intermediate 0.57% 0.075
Cerification level: EMT-Paramedics 96.12% 0.193
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Table 2—Determinants of Organizational Forgetting with Hiring and Separation Rates 
Pre-Hospital Trauma Incidents, Mississippi 2001–2005
Dependent variable: 
Log(total out-of-hospital time) Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Reduced form 
organizational 
forgetting  
(Eq. (8) with 
hiring &  
separation 
rates)
Cross-section  λ  ˜   E 0.6970 0.6908 0.6911 0.6933 0.6946[0.00822]*** [0.00801]*** [0.00718]*** [0.0047]*** [0.00478]***
Contract-area
 fixed effects  λ  ˜   E 0.7089 0.7010 0.7130 0.7109 0.6995[0.00268]*** [0.00555]*** [0.00499]*** [0.00444]*** [0.02679]***
Cross-section
 λ  ˜   E 0.6700 0.6805 0.6959 0.6934 0.6893[0.00713]*** [0.00748]*** [0.00719]*** [0.00465]*** [0.00461]***
Separation
0.2640 0.2983 0.3096 0.2921 0.3058
[0.02064]*** [0.02035]*** [0.02025]*** [0.01968]*** [0.01983]***
Hiring
0.3793 0.3126 0.3112 0.3134 0.3045
[0.0183]*** [0.01809]*** [0.01803]*** [0.01757]*** [0.01761]***
Contract-area
 fixed effects
 λ  ˜   E 0.7523 0.7079 0.7055 0.7028 0.6990[0.00282]*** [0.00644]*** [0.00559]*** [0.00485]*** [0.03443]***
Separation
−0.0188 −0.0169 −0.0234 −0.0150 −0.0093
[0.01961] [0.01893] [0.01875] [0.01814] [0.01835]
Hiring
0.0687 0.0154 0.0240 0.0288 0.0212
[0.01767]*** [0.01711] [0.01694] [0.0165]* [0.01649]
Firm turnover 
and skill decay 
(Eq. (9) with 
hiring &  
separation 
rates)
Cross-section
 λ  ˜   E 0.6807 0.6915 0.7176 0.6882 0.6533[0.00769]*** [0.0079]*** [0.00764]*** [0.00455]*** [0.00384]***
γ 0.4906 0.4155 0.4526 0.4664 0.3135[0.00451]*** [0.02353]*** [0.01391]*** [0.00523]*** [0.02037]***
μ 0.4596 0.2471 0.6358 1.4657 5.9486[0.25649]* [0.14136]* [0.27885]** [0.25987]*** [0.51753]***
Separation
0.2616 0.2958 0.3068 0.2881 0.3009
[0.02068]*** [0.02038]*** [0.02027]*** [0.01968]*** [0.0198]***
Hiring
0.3818 0.3156 0.3138 0.3166 0.3021
[0.01826]*** [0.01802]*** [0.01798]*** [0.01752]*** [0.01755]***
Contract-area
 fixed effects
 λ  ˜   E 0.7585 0.7575 0.8012 0.7810 0.7707[0.00202]*** [0.00552]*** [0.00463]*** [0.00344]*** [0.02705]***
γ 0.4984 0.4456 0.3841 0.3630 0.3687[0.00136]*** [0.01086]*** [0.02516]*** [0.00657]*** [0.07357]***
μ 1.7565 1.7901 1.3273 1.5867 1.3373[0.17636]*** [0.47801]*** [0.40484]*** [0.35761]*** [1.67305]
Separation
−0.0184 −0.0154 −0.0206 −0.0118 −0.0120
[0.01964] [0.01897] [0.0188] [0.01819] [0.01839]
Hiring
0.0681 0.0139 0.0216 0.0260 0.0218
[0.01764]*** [0.0171] [0.01694] [0.0165] [0.01651]
Observations 139,651 139,651 139,651 139,651 139,651
Controls
Number of procedures X X X X
Demographics and X X X
 people in incident
Trauma characteristics X X
Year, month, day of week, hour X
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in brackets below the estimated coefficients. Significance levels for 
estimates of μ are for tests against the null of μ = 1 (i.e. new and seasoned paramedics make equal contributions to firm recent expe-
rience). Patient demographics include indicators for race, gender, and 12 age categories. Trauma characteristics include the type of 
trauma, location of incidents, and injury characteristics. The types of trauma are falls, gunshot wounds, cuts or stabbings, assaults, 
motor vehicle crashes, and motorcycle and pedestrian accidents. Locations of incidents include residences, city streets, county 
roads, and state or federal highways. Injury characteristics include 70 interactions of injured body part and injury type. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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A. firm-Level Analysis
We estimate equations (8) and (9), first with no controls (Model I), then succes-
sively add possible confounders, as discussed in the previous section.17 All mod-
els are estimated by nonlinear least squares with heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors.
Table 2 reports estimates of organizational forgetting for the full sample, first 
cross-sectionally, then with contract-area fixed effects to account for unobserved 
differences in geography and severity across areas.18 The upper panel reports esti-
mates based on equation (8), which represents a reduced form of organizational 
forgetting, as it ignores the distinction between human capital depreciation and turn-
over effects. The estimates suggest that about a quarter of the stock of experience 
existing at the beginning of the year survives to the end of the year (0.699 4). When 
forgetting is identified only from changes over time within contract-area, the mea-
sure of forgetting is stable and tightly estimated, with 70 percent of a firm’s experi-
ence being carried over from a quarter ago to today’s performance.
Due to data limitations, previous studies of organizational forgetting could only 
address turnover effects by adding hiring and separation rates as regressors (Argote 
1999; Thompson 2007). This approach is valid and useful for eliciting organiza-
tional forgetting net of turnover effects under certain limiting scenarios. These 
include cases where there is no learning; there is learning but none of it is lost 
(i.e., the human capital accumulated by those leaving the firm stays with the firm); 
or human capital is lost due to exit, but is perfectly predicted by turnover rates. 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that separation rates embody all information regarding 
the human capital accumulated by those leaving the firm. For instance, consider two 
identical firms, one which replaces a highly experienced paramedic while the other 
replaces a relatively inexperienced one. Both firms will record the same turnover 
rate yet may differ in their production experience.
To test this empirically, the middle panel of Table 2 includes hiring and sep-
aration rates as regressors. In the cross section, hiring and separation rates have 
large adverse and significant effects on performance. However, when controlling 
for unobserved contract-area characteristics, these effects disappear. One possible 
explanation is that the magnitude of hiring and separation rates reflect the size of 
firms, with observed turnover rates decreasing in firm size. In our application, small 
firms are common in rural areas, in which total out-of-hospital times are inherently 
longer.
The lower panel of Table 2 reports estimates based on equation (9), in which firm 
experience is separated into human capital accrued by individuals still in the firm and 
by those who left the firm. We discuss the estimates of skill decay (1 − λE) and turn-
over effect (λE − γ) from the most saturated model (Model V) with  contract-area 
17 Sample size is slightly decreasing across models due to missing information on EMT certification levels and 
time stamps totaling less than 850 observations and resulting in approximately 174,000 in Model VI for the full 
sample.
18 Note that since equations (8) and (9) mimic the case in which data on paramedics are missing, it makes little 
sense to estimate models that include indicators for individual paramedics.
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fixed effects. We find the turnover effect to be roughly twice as large as the effect of 
human capital depreciation (0.402 compared with 0.229).
As indicated by our framework, the reduced form coefficient estimate of organi-
zational forgetting estimated from equation (8) and reported in the upper panel of 
Table 2 (0.699) is a weighted average of  λ E (0.771) and γ (0.369) from the lower 
panel.
In turn, the estimate of μ in equation (9) is unstable and imprecisely estimated 
across specifications. Model V with contract area fixed effects suggests that the 
hypothesis that a new paramedic is comparable to a seasoned one in terms of per-
formance cannot be rejected. While this null (i.e., μ = 1) implies that new and sea-
soned paramedics make equal contributions to firm recent experience, it does not 
imply that replacing an experienced paramedic by a new one is costless since a frac-
tion (λ − γ) of the former’s past human capital,  _ et−1 , would be lost entirely during 
replacement.
Put together, ( _ ϕt (1 − μ) +  _ et−1 ( λ E − γ))/( _ ϕt (1 − μ) +  _ et−1 (1 − γ)) is a 
measure of the relative importance of the cost of turnover. Assuming the average 
paramedic in our sample is replaced by one with no experience (i.e.,  _ ϕt ≅ 18.02 
and  
_ et−1 ≅ 209.44) we find that about 62 percent of organizational forgetting is 
attributable to turnover.19
Adding hiring and separation rates to equation (9) has no effect on the estimates of 
λE, γ, and μ. This suggests that hiring and separation rates provide inadequate infor-
mation in our application, as they are correlated neither with the recent experience of 
entrants nor with the value of human capital of employees no longer with the firm.
B. individual-Level Analysis
In our application, we find both human capital depreciation and turnover effects 
to be important channels through which organizational forgetting comes to bear. 
The detail of our data, which tracks individual employee activity, allows us to fur-
ther investigate mechanisms that may be responsible for individual skill decay by 
considering specifications that attribute performance entirely to paramedic-driver 
teams. More specifically, our data follows paramedics over 15 years. For 85 percent 
of paramedics, we observe their entry into the profession and onwards, and can 
therefore study learning and forgetting within individuals. For each incident, we 
control for time varying paramedic characteristics such as changes to their certifica-
tion-level as well as the experience and certification-level of the driver with which 
they are paired. Note that individual level data is not sufficient for studying individ-
ual skill decay. One needs an application that allows for attributing performance to 
individuals.20 In EMS, out-of-hospital time is produced by paramedic-driver pairs. 
Therefore, in addition to controlling for the driver characteristics, we control for the 
joint experience of each paramedic-driver pair.
19  
_ et−1 = f ( λ E ) is calculated assuming  λ E = 0.771 (as estimated in the most saturated contract area fixed effects 
specification in Table 2) for the uncensored paramedics sample.
20 The inability to attribute performance to individuals poses a measurement challenge in large scale manu-
facturing, where production often requires joint assembly and coordination. In this regard, the applicability of the 
individual-level analysis, outside of the service industry, may be limited.
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Consistent estimation by nonlinear least squares of individual skill decay mod-
els relies on random assignment of paramedics to scenes. In particular, it requires 
unobserved patient and scene characteristics to be unrelated to paramedic experi-
ence conditional on paramedic fixed effects. Table 3 reports estimates of models in 
which incident characteristics are regressed on paramedic experience, controlling 
for paramedic fixed effects. The results indicate that paramedic experience is unre-
lated to most observable patient and scene characteristics, providing some valida-
tion for our research design. In the few instances in which experience has some 
Table 3— Random Assignment Regressions with Paramedic Fixed Effects
Patient characteristics
Age indicators
Dependent variable: 5–14 14–18 18–25 25–35 35–45 45–55 55–65 65–75
Log quarterly volume 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.002 0.001 −0.003 0.0004 −0.001
 (91 days) [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Log cumulative volume −0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.0005 −0.001 −0.0004
 (excl. left-censored 
 paramedics)
[0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Log cumulative volume −0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.00005 −0.0004 −0.001
 (incl. left-censored 
 paramedics)
[0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Patient characteristics (cont.) Scene characteristics
Age (cont.) Number of 
Dependent variable: 75–85 White Female injuries Street Road Highway MVC
Log quarterly volume 0.0004 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.008 −0.005 0.005 −0.012
 (91 days) [0.002] [0.003]* [0.003] [0.013] [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.003]* [0.002]***
Log cumulative volume −0.005 0.007 0.001 0.001 −0.007 −0.005 −0.004 0.016
 (excl. left-censored 
 paramedics)
[0.003]* [0.006] [0.004] [0.024] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007]**
Log cumulative volume −0.005 0.008 0.001 −0.006 −0.007 −0.006 −0.003 0.016
 (incl. left-censored 
 paramedics)
[0.003]* [0.006] [0.004] [0.023] [0.006] [0.004]* [0.006] [0.007]**
Scene characteristics (cont.)
Hour indicators
Dependent variable: Gunshot Fall Motorcycle Pedestrian Cut/stab Assault 18–20 21–23
Log quarterly volume −0.001 0.006 0.001 0.001 −0.0004 0.005 −0.001 0.0004
 (91 days) [0.001] [0.002]*** [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]*** [0.003] [0.003]
Log cumulative volume 0.001 −0.013 −0.0001 −0.0004 −0.002 −0.002 0.004 −0.005
 (excl. left-censored 
 paramedics)
[0.001] [0.005]** [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Log cumulative volume 0.001 −0.014 0.0001 0.0001 −0.002 −0.002 0.002 −0.007
 (incl. left-censored 
 paramedics)
[0.001] [0.005]*** [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Notes: Paramedic fixed effects are included in all models since subsequent learning/forgetting models are estimated 
with fixed effects; and to allow for the possibility of paramedic sorting across time and across the firm’s coverage 
areas in a manner that matches their ability to the expected severity of scenes. Standard errors are reported in brack-
ets below the estimated coefficients, and are clustered at the paramedic level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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statistical significance, the magnitudes of the coefficients are extremely small.21 
This is not surprising, as the unpredictable nature of emergencies and the impor-
tance of total out-of-hospital time require ambulance units to be dispatched based 
solely on proximity.
To control for potential heterogeneity in productivity, we estimated specifications 
with paramedic fixed effects. These capture any time-invariant factors that affect 
individual performance and may be related to experience. For example, firms may 
require their most able paramedics to be on call during times when and/or locations 
where the volume and severity of trauma are expected to be high. This type of sort-
ing is absorbed into the fixed effect.22
The individual skill decay models are presented in Table 4, which reports esti-
mates of individual learning,  β e , and skill retention, λ, based on equation (7).23 
Individual skill decay measured at the paramedic level is comparable in magnitude 
to the estimates from the firm analysis, presented in Table 2. The upper panel reports 
the results for the full sample including all paramedics, and the lower panel reports 
results for the subsample that excludes paramedics who appeared in the data in 
1991, and are therefore potentially left-censored.24 Each panel contrasts estimates 
from cross-sectional, contract-area fixed effects, and paramedic fixed effects specifi-
cations, with successively more incident characteristics being controlled for moving 
from Model I to VI. As mentioned above, paramedic experience profiles are calcu-
lated on a rolling-quarters basis such that, for instance,  φ i,t is the number of runs in 
which paramedic i was involved over the 91-day period ending at date t. Standard 
errors are clustered at the paramedic level to allow for correlation in out-of-hospital 
times across incidents within the same paramedic.
The similar magnitudes in the upper and lower panels suggest that the problem 
of censored regressors, studied by Roberto Rigobon and Thomas M. Stoker (2009), 
does not appear to be severe in this context. Given the estimated magnitude of quar-
terly individual forgetting, this similarity most probably stems from the irrelevance 
of experiences accumulated prior to 1991 to performance after the beginning of our 
sample, in 2001. Focusing on the uncensored sample and the paramedic fixed effects 
specifications, the estimates of  β e are relatively insensitive to the set of controls 
and imply statistically significant learning on the part of paramedics. All else con-
stant, a 50 percent increase in paramedic experience is associated with roughly 40 
seconds shorter total-out-of-hospital duration. Finally, Table 5 indicates that there 
is a consistent and statistically significant degree of skill decay, and is larger in 
magnitude than the aggregate skill decay reported in Table 2. While both equations 
(7) and (9) produce strong evidence of skill decay, the discrepancy in magnitudes 
21 The largest effect is for the incidents of motor vehicle crashes (MVC), where a 1 percent increase in cumula-
tive experience is associated with a 0.00016 percentage point increase in the likelihood being dispatched to a MVC 
scene.
22 Bias may result from evolutionary forces such as learning about match quality, which has implications for 
separation decisions. To test for potential attrition bias, we perform a version of the Marno Verbeek and Theo 
Nijman (1992) variable addition test described in Jeffrey M. Wooldridge (2002) in which leads and lags of selec-
tion indicators are added as regressors. This approach is attractive in this context since it is implementable in a fixed 
effects specification. We find no evidence of attrition bias.
23 Note that individual forgetting is 1 − λ.
24 Note that the full sample was used for the firm analysis (Tables 2 and 3), as censoring would not be possible 
to infer absent individual identifiers.
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of human capital retention may be driven by differences in volatility of the two 
measures of experience. Paramedic-level experience profiles are more volatile than 
their firm’s experience profile, which tracks the demand for emergency trauma care, 
and are therefore more likely to generate lower (and less tightly estimated) retention 
coefficients.
Table 4—Paramedic-Level Learning and Forgetting 
Pre-Hospital Trauma Incidents, Mississippi 2001–2005
Dependent variable: 
Log(total out-of-hospital time) Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
including left-censored paramedics
Cross-section
Learning (βe)
−0.00924 −0.02986 −0.02787 −0.00156 −0.00271 −0.00530
[0.00541]* [0.00678]*** [0.00676]*** [0.00063]** [0.00183] [0.00368]
Retention (λ) 1.74084 0.55551 0.55610 140.90450 14.10342 3.92207[0.98028]* [0.09076]*** [0.09429]***[188.2986] [25.81297] [4.75924]
Contract-area  
 fixed effects 
Learning (βe)
−0.02856 −0.02877 −0.02862 −0.02778 −0.02612 −0.02669
[0.00381]*** [0.00379]*** [0.00372]*** [0.00364]*** [0.00368]*** [0.00376]***
Retention (λ) 0.69670 0.58178 0.58155 0.59285 0.60616 0.60837[0.04093]*** [0.04857]*** [0.04752]*** [0.04611]*** [0.04828]*** [0.04739]***
Paramedic  
 fixed effects
Learning (βe)
−0.02784 −0.02925 −0.02867 −0.02447 −0.03437 −0.03539
[0.00662]*** [0.00642]*** [0.00632]*** [0.00635]*** [0.00877]*** [0.0088]***
Retention (λ) 0.49701 0.48027 0.47164 0.49441 0.69686 0.70002[0.10903]*** [0.10528]*** [0.1092]*** [0.12045]*** [0.0789]*** [0.07677]***
Observations 177,455 177,455 177,455 177,455 177,455 176,508
Number of clusters 2,044 2,044 2,044 2,044 2,044 2,022
Excluding left-censored paramedics
Cross-section
Learning (βe)
−0.01020 −0.03354 −0.03157 −0.00114 −0.00291 −0.00637
[0.00646] [0.00725]*** [0.00718]*** [0.00038]*** [0.00242] [0.00468]
Retention (λ) 1.56288 0.58284 0.56785 1171.24900 8.76735 2.67375[0.81404]* [0.08794]*** [0.09379]***[1261.453] [16.89843] [2.64565]
Contract-area  
 fixed effects
 
Learning (βe)
−0.03088 −0.03153 −0.03146 −0.03098 −0.02971 −0.03026
[0.00415]*** [0.00415]*** [0.00408]*** [0.00402]*** [0.00406]*** [0.00414]***
Retention (λ) 0.72453 0.61603 0.61440 0.62318 0.64005 0.63925[0.04175]*** [0.04602]*** [0.04486]*** [0.04364]*** [0.04505]*** [0.04455]***
Paramedic  
 fixed effects
Learning (βe)
−0.02963 −0.03065 −0.03025 −0.02624 −0.03617 −0.03727
[0.00694]*** [0.00676]*** [0.0066]*** [0.00657]*** [0.00877]*** [0.00876]***
Retention (λ) 0.51765 0.49851 0.49030 0.51431 0.71150 0.71269[0.10731]*** [0.10814]*** [0.1101]*** [0.1197]*** [0.07867]*** [0.07605]***
Observations 146,969 146,969 146,969 146,969 146,969 146,185
Number of clusters 1,738 1,738 1,738 1,738 1,738 1,718
Controls
Number of procedures X X X X X
Demographics and people in incident X X X X
Trauma characteristics X X X
Year, month, day of week, hour X X
Certification level X
Notes: All models control for driver and paramedic-driver pair experiences. Patient demographics include indica-
tors for race, gender, and 12 age categories. Trauma characteristics include the type of trauma, location of inci-
dents, and injury characteristics. The types of trauma are falls, gunshot wounds, cuts or stabbings, assaults, motor 
vehicle crashes, and motorcycle and pedestrian accidents.  Locations of incidents include residences, city streets, 
county roads, and state or federal highways. Injury characteristics include 70 interactions of injured body part and 
injury type. Standard errors are reported in brackets below the estimated coefficients, and are clustered at the para-
medic level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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In all of our specifications, it is important to note that even if our controls for inter-
ventions on scene, injury profile, trauma characteristics, and patient demographics 
reflect severity only to a limited extent, concerns regarding omitted variables are not 
likely to be important given the current EMS system design. It is difficult to argue 
Table 5—Mechanisms for Skill Decay and Falsification Test 
Pre-Hospital Trauma Incidents, Mississippi 2001–2005
Dependent variable: Specifications with periods of inactivity
Log(total out-of-hospital time) Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Learning (βe) −0.03564 −0.03551 −0.03438 −0.02970 −0.04284 −0.04322[0.00862]*** [0.00835]*** [0.00805]*** [0.00796]*** [0.01083]*** [0.01083]***
Retention (λ) 0.55049 0.52433 0.50996 0.52801 0.73962 0.73974
[0.10319]*** [0.1074]*** [0.11228]*** [0.12382]*** [0.07806]*** [0.07781]***
Days since 0.00072 0.00072 0.00068 0.00061 0.00069 0.00069
 last run [0.00021]*** [0.00021]*** [0.0002]*** [0.00019]*** [0.00019]*** [0.00019]***
Observations 146,012 146,012 146,012 146,012 146,012 145,248
Number of clusters 1,657 1,657 1,657 1,657 1,657 1,644
Specifications including experience with medical incidents
Log(total out-of-hospital time) Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Learning (βe) −0.01892 −0.04548 −0.04457 −0.03837 −0.04335 −0.02927[0.01272] [0.01594]*** [0.01551]*** [0.01498]** [0.0195]** [0.00886]***
Retention (λ) 0.48310 0.61104 0.60049 0.61268 0.72616 0.64383
[0.26701]* [0.08771]*** [0.08835]*** [0.10046]*** [0.12479]*** [0.10711]***
Learning (βeM) −0.01105 0.02396750 0.02536 0.020915 0.00936 −0.00129[0.01218] [0.0160294] [0.01593] [0.01526] [0.01867] [0.00191]
Retention (λM) 0.48929 0.85149 0.87804 0.90076 0.75880 34.44258
[0.38699] [0.14122]*** [0.14152]*** [0.17695]*** [0.52887] [157.4546]
Observations 146,970 146,970 146,970 146,970 146,970 146,191
Number of clusters 1,738 1,738 1,738 1,738 1,738 1,718
Falsification test
Log(time alerted) Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Learning (βe) −0.001575 −0.001543 −0.001641 −0.001978 −0.003000 −0.003692[0.00527] [0.00454] [0.00386] [0.00314] [0.00337] [0.00509]
Forgetting (λ) 0.00000 0.00070 0.00004 0.00006 0.00005 0.00113
[0.00001] [0.00776] [0.0004] [0.00027] [0.00025] [0.00825]
Observations 147,061 147,061 147,061 146,993 146,993 146,209
Number of clusters 1,741 1,741 1,741 1,740 1,740 1,720
controls
Number of procedures X X X X X
Demographics and people in incident X X X X
Trauma characteristics X X X
Year, month, day of week, hour X X
Certification level X
Notes: All models are estimated with paramedic fixed effects, exclude left-censored paramedics, and control for 
driver and paramedic-driver pair experiences. Patient demographics include indicators for race, gender, and 12 age 
categories. Trauma characeristics include the type of trauma, location of incidents, and injury characteristics. The 
types of trauma are falls, gunshot wounds, cuts or stabbings, assaults, motor vehicle crashes, and motorcycle and 
pedestrian accidents.  Locations of incidents include residences, city streets, county roads, and state or federal high-
ways. Injury characteristics include 70 interactions of injured body part and injury type. Standard errors are reported 
in brackets below the estimated coefficients, and are clustered at the paramedic level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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for a correlation between severity and experience, due to the fact that dispatching 
is determined by proximity to the scene and not by paramedic reputation. However, 
even if dispatch matched paramedic experience with patient severity, it is unlikely 
that indications of higher acuity would result in the dispatching of the least expe-
rienced crews, which is the only mechanism that would account for our results. If 
there is matching between paramedic experience and patient severity, our coefficient 
estimates of βe underestimate the true degree of learning.
While our regressions control for the count of procedures performed on-scene, 
one might worry about selection on the complexity of procedures performed by 
paramedics. For example, if inexperienced paramedics choose simpler proce-
dures, which require relatively fewer minutes, we might infer that less experience 
results in shorter on-scene times conditional on the number of procedures. This 
would lead us to underestimate the magnitude of the experience premium. To 
address this concern, we replaced the procedure counts with a set of 33 procedures 
indicators. Our results are insensitive to this replacement and, for brevity, are not 
reported here.
As individual skill decay accounts for approximately 38 percent of organizational 
forgetting in EMS, it is important to better understand how individual paramedic 
forgetting may come to bear. We test two potential mechanisms for skill decay: pro-
duction breaks through periods of inactivity and interference through a wider set of 
tasks; in our application, the performance of non-trauma (medical) tasks.
We extend the analysis presented in Table 4 by recording the number of days 
elapsed since the last trauma run for each paramedic and adding it as a regressor 
to equation (7). Under this mechanism of skill decay, pre-hospital times that fol-
low longer periods of inactivity may be lengthier. The results, reported in the upper 
panel of Table 5, indicate that additional days of trauma inactivity carry a small but 
statistically significant cost, suggesting that an additional day of inactivity is associ-
ated with pre-hospital intervals that are on average one second longer. Comparing 
estimates of βe and λ in Tables 4 and upper panel of Table 5, omitting length of 
inactivity does not appear to confound our estimates.25
In general, periods of inactivity encompass two alternative time uses: one includes 
activities that are at least partially relevant to performance, while the other includes 
irrelevant tasks. In EMS, non-trauma events such as stroke or cardiac arrest may 
have relevance to trauma performance to the extent that they involve similar clinical 
interventions and/or patient interaction.
From a learning perspective, adding paramedics’ experience histories with 
medical incidents to the specification allows for productivity spillovers in experi-
ence across medical and trauma incident types.26 Greater experience with medical 
incidents may confer some benefits at the scene of trauma if mechanically similar 
25 Note, however, that paramedic volume already captures some of the information contained in our measure 
of paramedic inactivity: as the average number of inactive days inversely corresponds to the number of trauma 
incidents in a given quarter. Nevertheless, the point estimates in the upper panel of Table 5 indicate slightly more 
learning and less forgetting, as expected when controlling for the confounding effect of recent inactivity.
26 Robert S. Huckman and Gary P. Pisano (2006) study same-task transferability for surgeons across different 
hospitals and its effect on patient mortality. Our analysis studies potentially heterogeneous skills and their effect on 
performance in a single setting.
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tasks are performed in both types of incidents or learning about patient manage-
ment accrued over medical scenes is transferable to trauma scenes. The middle 
panel of Table 5 presents results from estimating equation (7′ ) below, in which 
medical experience is added to trauma experience in (7), and is parameterized as 
in (1):
(7′ )  ln oh T ikt =  β e ln  (λ  e i,t−1 +  ϕ i,t ) +  β e M ln  ( λ M  e i,t−1 M +  ϕ i,t M) 
 +  β X X kt +  β W W it +  φ t +  η i +  ε ikt ,
where an “M” superscript indicates a variable or parameter relating to medical runs. 
Using this specification, we find little evidence of transferability across incident 
types, as estimates of  β e M are indistinguishable from zero across all models. This 
may result from EMS protocols being more well-established for medical events 
relative to trauma events (Carr et al. 2006).
In addition to studying transferability of human capital, equation (7′ ) simultane-
ously explores interference of experience accumulated from medical incidents with 
performance at the trauma scene. The scope of tasks that each individual carries 
out may interfere with their performance on a given task through weaker memory 
retrieval, which may contribute to skill decay (Arthur et al. 1998). The seven per-
centage point drop in the retention parameter, λ, in the middle panel of Table 5 (rela-
tive to Table 4) could be interpreted as evidence of task interference.
Finally, we implement a falsification exercise by estimating the same models 
described by equation (7), in which we replace the dependent variable, total out-
of-hospital time, with an alternative marker of system performance, dispatch time. 
Dispatch time is defined as the length of time between a 9-1-1 call and the moment 
paramedics are notified and dispatched to the scene. This measure provides the basis 
for a credible falsification test as, unlike time spent en route and on-scene, para-
medics have no influence on it. Therefore, we do not expect to find a relationship 
between individual paramedic experience and dispatch time. The lower panel of 
Table 5 validates our performance measure as we find no evidence of learning or 
skill decay in the case of dispatch time, lending credibility to our results.
V. Conclusion
Studies of organizational learning and forgetting identify potential channels 
through which the firm’s production experience is lost. While the ability to dis-
tinguish between these channels has implications for efficient resource allocation 
within the firm, to date, their relative importance has largely been ignored. This 
paper develops a framework for eliciting the contributions of the two most salient 
channels, labor turnover and human capital depreciation, to organizational forget-
ting. When applying our framework to ambulance companies and their workforce, 
we find evidence of organizational forgetting, which results from skill decay and 
turnover effects. The latter has twice the magnitude of the former.
Similar to shipbuilding, automobile and aircraft manufacturing, and pizza fran-
chises, where forgetting has been documented, emergency medical services are 
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labor intensive, subject to high labor turnover, and learning-by-doing is thought to 
be important at the individual worker level.
In some cases, organizational forgetting is associated with breaks in production 
and demand volatility. However, organizational forgetting may occur even under 
continuous production if individual skills depreciate over time and/or the human 
capital of employees is lost to labor turnover. For instance, high observed turnover 
rates were hypothesized to cause organizational forgetting in pizza franchises (Darr, 
Argote, and Epple 1995). EMS is characterized by high labor turnover as personnel 
face a difficult, often hazardous, work environment.27 In our application, we find 
that labor turnover accounts for 62 percent of organizational forgetting.
To test whether the large turnover effects we find in EMS are a feature of the 
industry or a feature of our framework, we follow Thompson (2007) by adding 
hiring and separation rates to the standard reduced form organizational forgetting 
specification. In our application, hiring and separation rates neither capture the true 
effect of labor turnover nor refine the estimates of organizational forgetting. The 
inadequate information embedded in hiring and separation rates suggests that other 
studies that lacked the ability to track individuals and therefore relied on firm-level 
measures of hiring and separation may have understated turnover effects.
While the bulk of firms and employment in developed countries is concentrated 
in the service sector,28 studies of organizational learning and forgetting focus almost 
exclusively on large scale industrial settings, such as commercial aircrafts (Benkard 
2000), automobile production (Epple, Argote, and Murphy 1996) and ships 
(Argote, Beckman, and Epple 1990; Thompson 2001; Rebecca Achee Thornton 
and Thompson 2001; Thompson 2007). In these large-scale production endeavors, 
organizational forgetting is the result of a mixture of firm and employee level expe-
rience depreciation. This is, therefore, a reduced-form phenomenon that encom-
passes a number of mediators including turnover, literal forgetting by individuals, 
and adaptation to technological innovations. Hence, a benefit of studying produc-
tion of services is the ability to attribute performance to individuals. This is true in 
our application; emergency medical services are universal and involve measures of 
performance that are attributable to individual paramedics. As discussed earlier, the 
ability to track individuals is necessary for eliciting the contributions of labor turn-
over and human capital depreciation to organizational forgetting.
The ability to attribute performance to individuals in emergency medical services 
speaks not only to the richness of our data but also to the nature of production in 
service industries, which relies heavily on individual performance (e.g., a mailman, 
a dentist, a plumber, or a customer service representative). This, in turn, imposes 
limitations for generalizing our findings to settings where there is reliance on joint 
production.
27 Paramedics are exposed to potentially infectious bodily fluids, for instance through contact with contaminated 
needles, and to the hepatitis B virus (Delbridge et al. 1998). Moreover, they are frequently exposed to the threat of 
violence, incur injuries associated with lifting or falling, and face oncoming traffic at the scene of motor vehicle 
crashes. Occupational fatality rates for paramedics are comparable to those of police and fire personnel. There are 
12.7 fatalities per 100,000 EMS workers annually, which compares with 14.2 for police and 16.5 for firefighters, 
and a national average of 5 fatalities across all professions (Brian J. Maguire et al. 2002).
28 For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that 75 percent of total US employment in 2006 was 
concentrated in the service industry.
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While services and manufacturing differ in their production environments, ambu-
lance companies do resemble manufacturers in their responsibility for hiring, train-
ing, contracting, maintenance of equipment, scheduling, and strategic planning. 
EMS companies provide service elements that individual paramedics are not able 
to provide in isolation. For example, around-the-clock coverage is a key contract-
ible feature of emergency services. Our analysis suggests that about a quarter of the 
firm’s stock of experience existing at the beginning of the year survives to the end 
of the year. This reduced form estimate is lower than recent findings for an aircraft 
manufacturer (about 60 percent according to Benkard 2000), close to the 35 percent 
for Liberty shipbuilders (Thompson 2007), and higher than the 5 percent estimated 
by Darr, Argote, and Epple (1995) in the case of pizza franchises. This may suggest 
that a firm’s ability to mitigate organizational forgetting is weaker in the tertiary sec-
tor, and calls for additional studies of service delivery.
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